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Abstract  In mass customization, companies strive to enhance customer value by providing 
products and services that are approximate to customers’ needs. A company’s strategy of 
allocating its limited capacity to meeting diverse customer requirements directly impact 
customer perceived value in terms of available options, cost, and schedule. Proposed in this 
paper is an auction-based mass customization model for solving the problem of service 
customization under capacity constraints (SCCC). The proposed model integrates customers’ 
customization decision making with the allocation of company’s capacity through multilateral 
negotiation between the company and its customers. The negotiation is conducted through a 
combinatorial iterative auction designed to maximize the overall customer value given limited 
capacity. The auction is incentive-compatible in the sense that customers will follow the 
prescribed myopic best-response bidding strategy. Experimental results indicate that 
customization solutions computed by the proposed model are very close to the optimal one. 
Revenue performance is also adequate when there is sufficient competition in the market.  
Keyword: Mass customization, capacity allocation, service customization, combinatorial 
iterative auction, multilateral negotiation, design by customers 
1. Introduction 
Mass Customization aims at producing what the customers need with near mass production 
efficiency. It can be seen as a collaborative optimization process between a company and its 
customers with the goal of finding the best match between the company’s capabilities and the 
customers' needs. A company’s core capabilities are the basis of its product families and their 
successive platforms (Meyer and Utterback, 1993). These capabilities are reflected in the people 
and assets applied to the development of new products. A company’s capabilities can be 
represented by its Product Family Architecture (PFA) (Tseng and Jiao, 1996; Jiao and Tseng, 
1999) which consists of a common base, a differentiation enabler, and a configuration 




mechanism. While PFA can serve as a systematic protocol for customers to navigate through the 
company’s capabilities and define their own requirements, capabilities can also be organized and 
presented using scalable product family design (Simpson et al., 2001) and configurational 
product family design (Du et al., 2001; Ulrich, 1995). In scalable product family design, a 
variety of customer needs is satisfied through the configuration of scaling variables which are 
used to “stretch” or “shrink” the product platform in one or more dimensions. Configurational 
product family design, on the other hand, aims at developing a modular product platform on 
which product family members are derived by adding, substituting, and/or removing one or more 
functional modules. The pursue for a better match between the company’s capabilities and 
customer needs has been the central theme in the mass customization literature (Jiao et. al, 2007; 
Simpson, 2004; Da Silveira et. al, 2001). In this paper a different perspective is taken to examine 
the impact of a company’s capacity on product customizability and customer value. Here the 
term capacity is defined as a company’s ability to produce customized products for a group of 
customers within a predefined time schedule.  
It is imperative to consider a company’s capacity constraints in customization decision 
making when production schedules are of importance to customers. This is particular true in 
service customization. Unlike product manufacturing, service production usually involves 
customer labor in the process (i.e., co-production) or requires the physical presence of the 
customer. Common examples can be seen in health care offices, buffet restaurants, and travel 
services. For service customers, it is desirable to have convenient production schedules because 
they need to physically present during service production. In addition, the service provider’s 
capacity is perishable because service operations cannot rely on inventories to adjust to demand 
fluctuations. Perishability alludes to the time-sensitive nature of a service provider’s capacity to 
produce the service (Sampson, 2001). In service customization, capacity constraints directly 
affect customers’ satisfaction and the provider’s profitability. Therefore, capacity constraints 
should be integrated into the service customization decision making. 
To motivate the research from a practical perspective, consider the case of mass 
customization of travel packages. Major online travel brands such as Expedia Inc. 
(Expedia.com), Opodo (Opodo.com), and Orbitz Worldwide (Orbitz.com) are giving their 
customers tools to customize their own adventures in the form of “build your own package”. 




because everyone’s travel experience is unique and personal. A customized vacation package 
usually includes one or more of the following components: flight reservation, hotel reservation, 
car rental, and tickets to entertainment events. For a specific destination and a specific time 
window, the capacity limits of these components restrict customers’ options and affect the 
customizability of travel products. This is particularly the case during high seasons when the 
capacity of service providers is heavily demanded. Similar situations occur in manufacturing 
mass customization. For example, in configurational product family design, a customer 
customizes its individual product by adding a group of functional modules to a base product. If a 
particular module takes excessively longer time to obtain due to the manufacture’s capacity 
constraints, the customer may switch to an alternative module or even cancel the function.  
This paper is concerned with the capacity aspect of mass customization. Specifically, it 
answers the question: Given limited capacity, how can a company maximize the value provided 
to its customers by coordinating customers’ customization requirements? The main objective of 
the proposed approach is to maximize value across a large group of customers, which is, in 
economics terms, to maximize the social welfare (Mas-Colell et al., 1995). To facilitate clear 
formulation of the problem and meaningful presentation of the solution, the scope of the paper is 
restricted to service customization settings. However, the proposed model can be applied to 
manufacturing customization. In this paper, service customization under capacity constraints is 
modeled as an optimization problem; a design-by-customers approach is implemented using an 
auction. The contribution to the literature is two-fold. First, customers’ customization decision 
making is integrated with company’s capacity constraints, which is of particular relevance in 
service customization settings where a provider’s capacity is perishable and often expensive to 
expand. Second, at system level, the overall value provided to customers is maximized by 
coordinating customers’ customization requirements through auction-based multilateral 
negotiation. It is assumed that a company’s objective is to maximize overall customer value. This 
objective is desirable because, in the long run, a company can improve its profit only by 
providing customers with high value added products and services. The rest of the paper is 
organized as follows. In Section II related literature is reviewed with an emphasis on the mass 
customization approaches that consider capacity constraints. In Section III a formulation for the 
SCCC problem is provided. In Section IV an auction-based negotiation model for service 




model to a special case of the SCCC problem are provided. The performance of the model on 
general SCCC problem is evaluated through a computational study. Conclusion and future 
research directions are presented in Section VI. 
2. Literature Review 
In mass customization manufacturing, capacity constraints are usually addressed from the 
customization management perspective in the context of manufacturing planning and scheduling. 
Focus has been placed on managing variety in production planning and using more flexible 
distributed coordination models for resource allocation (Tseng and Jiao, 2001). Typical 
distributed coordination models in manufacturing planning and scheduling include agent-based 
manufacturing (Shen et al, 2006), holonic manufacturing (Guo et al., 1994), holonic-based 
architecture for process manufacturing (Chokshi and McFarlane, 2008), and market-based 
mechanisms (Shaw, 1988; Baker, 1991; Lin and Solberg, 1992; Wellman et al, 2001). These 
distributed coordination models usually have a high level of responsiveness and can be supported 
by real-time resource availability estimation algorithms (Moses et al., 2008). Given that 
manufacturing planning and scheduling are usually considered as back-end issues confined 
within the boundary of the manufacture, in existing mass customization manufacturing 
approaches, capacity allocation is not explicitly integrated into front-end customer requirement 
definition and negotiation. 
Compared with that in manufacturing sectors, customization research in services is relatively 
limited. As pointed out in Da Silveira et al. (2001), the lack of studies dealing with mass 
customization in service operations is perhaps one of the main gaps in the current mass 
customization literature. Anderson et al. (1997) contend that customizing a firm’s offering to 
meet diverse needs of individual consumers is more important for satisfying service customers 
than for satisfying consumers of goods. Voss and Hsuan (2009) propose that service customization 
can be either combinatorial (i.e., the combination of a set of service processes and products to 
create a unique service) or menu driven (the selection of one or more services from a set of 
existing services/products to meet customer needs). Central to the combinatorial and menu 
driven approaches to service customization is the concept of modularity, a building block of 
modularized service system architecture. It is argued that the service architecture considered as a 




concept of modularity and decomposition, Cao et al. (2006) propose an interactive service 
customization model which allows users to incrementally define the customized service process 
through a series of operations, including activation of goal decomposition, reusable component 
selection, and process composition. The on-demand process composition is supported by 
reusable standardized process components. Another stream of service customization research 
applies principles from product family design to service development. Moon et al. (2010) 
develop a module-based service model to represent the relationships between functions and 
processes in a service and to facilitate customized service design. In their service customization 
model, a module selection problem for platform design is considered as a strategic module-
sharing problem under a collaboration situation. A coalitional game is used to model potential 
module sharing and determine which modules used in the platform create the most value. Similar 
to their manufacturing customization counterparts, existing service customization approaches are 
also “capability-oriented”. In addition, they focus more on product modularity and 
decomposition.  
The proposed customization model can be categorized as a design-by-customers approach. 
Tseng and Du (1998) present a two-phased design-by-customers process: customer needs 
acquisition phase and product design phase. In the customer needs acquisition phase, customers 
are first informed of the design options in terms of the company’s PFA and then asked to 
prioritize desired product configurations in terms of the value they attach to product attribute 
levels. Product design phase involves an iterative refinement procedure in which customers can 
modify the attributes of the product through configuring the available building blocks. The 
objective of the iterative refinement procedure is to find a good building blocks configuration 
such that the customer gets a satisfactory utility from the customized product. Different from 
Tseng and Du (1998), the focus of this paper is rather on the integration of company’s producing 
capacity with product’s customizability. It is assumed that the company’s capabilities are given 
and the customers know their value on different configuration of the product options. In addition, 
the proposed approach is mainly tailored to services customization. 
In the extant literature, the most relevant study to the proposed approach is a negotiation-
based methodology for custom product co-design proposed by Chen and Tseng (2007). In their 
paper, a bargaining procedure is proposed to explore and align demand and supply flexibilities. 




exhibits some level of flexibility. Design decision making is taken as distributed and interactive 
problem solving with each side alternately making offers and counteroffers and collectively 
searching for mutually satisfactory solutions. Different from our approach, the focus of Chen and 
Tseng (2007) is on capability (features and attributes) negotiation rather than capacity 
negotiation. In addition, the negotiation model proposed in Chen and Tseng (2007) is a bilateral 
negotiation mechanism, whereas in this paper a multilateral model for service capacity 
negotiation is proposed. Chen and Tseng (2010) also propose an auction-based negotiation 
approach for procuring customized products. In their approach, after evaluating each proposed 
solution and assigning a bidding credit based on the solution’s value premium, the customer 
conducts a reverse English auction in which manufacturers bid openly with incrementally lower 
prices (with product specifications being fixed). The lowest-price bidder will be awarded the 
contract and receive its bid price plus bidding credit as the final payment. While both Chen and 
Tseng (2010) and the proposed approach use auctions to address the incentive compatibility 
issue in a distributed environment, the auction proposed in Chen and Tseng (2010) is a standard 
single item reverse auction, whereas the proposed model is an iterative combinatorial auction 
with non-linear and non-anonymous package pricing. The proposed model is suitable for 
customers whose preferences exhibit complementarity over customized packages. While 
auctions accommodate complementary preferences have been well studied in the combinatorial 
auction literature (de Vries and Vohra, 2003), the proposed model is an iterative combinatorial 
auction specifically designed for service mass customization. The properties of the model and its 
effectiveness under various levels of product customizability have also been analyzed. Blecker et 
al. (2004) propose an auction-based framework for variety formation and steering in mass 
customization. In their approach, the main product building blocks are modeled as autonomous 
rational agents participating in an auction market where they compete by bidding to form product 
variants. To ensure their self-preservation, agents have to compute suitable bidding strategies 
with the best chances to meet customers' requirements. This is a distributed coordination model 
aiming at matching the company’s capability with customer’s requirements.  
Travel package auctions have become one of the most popular service auctions on the Internet. 
Pre-packaged vacations are sold in travel auction websites, including eBay Travel 
(http://www.ebay.com), Luxury Link (http://www.luxurylink.com), and Sky Auction 




date ranges. Different from our auction-based customization model, existing online travel 
auctions usually do not provide the flexibility of bidding for a customized package.  
3. Service Customization under Capacity Constraints  
This section provides a formulation of the SCCC problem which consists of a group of 
customers and a service provider. Customers want to customize the service products. To provide 
a common design domain, the provider is assumed to adopt a configurational product family 
design approach (Du et al., 2001; Ulrich, 1995) such that it can present its capabilities in the 
form of a set of building blocks (services). Customers can customize the product by choosing a 
base product (a pre-defined group of services) and adding optional services according to their 
preferences. A customized product is a package of services chosen by a customer. For example, a 
vacation package can include transportation services, accommodation services, and additional 
entertainment activities. For a provider, a service has a capacity limit which is defined as the 
number of customers the service can accommodate during a specified time window. For each 
package of services, the customer attaches a value to it. This paper follows the private value 
model introduced by Vickrey (1961). According to the private value model, a customer has a 
value for each package, and this value does not depend on other customers’ private information. 
A customer’s payoff is linear in the customer’s valuation of the package and the price paid for it. 
To maintain a positive payoff, the customer is willing to pay up to their value to obtain the 
package. It is important to note that a customer’s value is fixed and hence not a function of the 
price paid for a package. However, a customer’s payoff decreases when the price of the package 
increases.  
Formally, the SCCC problem consists of a set of   customers and a set of   services. A 
customer can configure its service package by selecting a group of services. A service package 
has to include a pre-configured set of services, that is, the base configuration, denoted  ̅. For 
service  , its capacity is limited by            . Let    be the set of service packages which are 
acceptable by customer   (i.e., feasible packages) and   be the union of the sets of acceptable 
service packages from all customers,   ⋃        . Let       be the value of customer   
attached to the service package    .         if     ;         otherwise. Let         
if the package    is allocated to customer   and zero otherwise. The SCCC problem involves 




constraints are respected and, at the same time, the sum of customer value (social welfare, in 
terms of microeconomics) derived from the selected packages is maximized. The problem can be 
formulated as the following integer programming. 
   ∑ ∑              
 
             
subject to 
∑                                 (1)  
∑ ∑                   
 
                 (2) 
∑          ∑                          (3) 
∑          ∑             ̅             (4) 
      {   }                         (5)   
Constraints (1) ensure that a customer can only obtain one service package. Constraints (2) 
ensure that the allocation of a service to customers does not exceed the capacity limit of the 
service provider. The set of constraints (3) ensure that if a package is assigned to a customer, it 
must belong to the set of product configurations acceptable by the customer. These constraints 
prevent the provider from assigning customers packages which they are not willing to accept. 
Constraints (4) enforce the selection of the base configuration in each awarded packages. 
Constraints (5) are a set of integer constraints. The provider’s SCCC problem is NP-hard as 
stated in the following theorem.  
Theorem 1: The problem of service customization under capacity constraints (SCCC) is NP-
hard.  
Proof: To show that SCCC is NP-hard, consider a special case in which      for all 
       and  ̅    . In this case, Constraints (3) and Constraints (4) always hold. The relaxed 
model is a set packing problem, which is NP-complete (Karp, 1972). It follows that, as a general 
case, SCCC problem is NP-hard . 
 The SCCC is an integer programming model which takes customer value as input. The key 
question to be asked here is how the value which each customer assigns to the package can be 
obtained. The way of computing value from product configurations can be customer specific. 
One approach suggested by Tseng and Du (1998) is to use methods designed to measure 
consumer preferences in marketing research, such as conjoint analysis (IntelliQuest, 1990). 




attribute can include several discrete levels. To apply conjoint analysis to SCCC, each service is 
modeled as an attribute and the discrete levels of attributes are restricted to 1 (service included) 
and 0 (service not included). As SCCC requires customers’ complete valuation on all feasible 
packages, computing value for each and every configuration may become impractical when the 
space of feasible packages becomes large. Although customers can determine the value of 
feasible packages, they may be reluctant to report the value back to the service provider because, 
by the definition of private value model, value is the highest price that a customer is willing to 
pay for a given package. In many cases, these prices are sensitive private information. The 
following section proposes an auction-based service customization model which computes high 
quality solutions to SCCC without requiring valuations from customers.  
4. The Auction-Based Service Customization Model  
Auctions have long been considered as an effective way of allocating limited resources to 
competing users and of discovering market prices for products and services. In recent years, the 
pervasive inter-connectivity provided by the Internet has made auctions a popular mechanism 
that directly links the capacities of service providers with end customers. The proposed auction is 
a price mechanism in which a provider coordinates the customization requirements among its 
customers by adjusting the prices of service packages. In this section, the design of the auction is 
first described and then a worked example is presented to demonstrate the application of the 
auction to travel package customization. We also discuss important incentive and 
implementation considerations of the auction design in this section. 
4.1. The Auction Model 
The auction is designed as an iterative bidding procedure. A customer’s bid is represented as a 
price-package pair 〈                     〉, where package is the set of services that the 
customer wants and the               is the price that the customer is willing to pay for the 
services to be delivered. The bidding price is customer-dependent. A non-anonymous price 
structure, in which there is no common public price for a package, is deployed in the model. This 
structure allows the provider to price the same package differently for different customers, which 
is a common practice in many service industries. The bidding procedure consists of four 






Before the bidding starts, the provider presents to the customers the set of available services 
and the base configuration that must be included in a customized package. Customers compute 
their respective sets of feasible packages   . For each package in   , the customer computes their 
value attached to it. The provider usually has a reservation price for each of the packages, which 
is the lowest price that the package can be bought. The initial bidding price for a package is set to 
be equal to its reservation price. If the reservation prices are unknown to the customers as in 
some online auctions, the initial bidding prices are set to zero. Knowing the values and initial 
bidding prices of packages in their   , a customer computes the payoff of each package. As 
explained previously, under the private value model, a customer’s payoff for a package is the 
difference between their value and the bidding price. To maintain a positive payoff, the customer 
is willing to pay up to their value to get the package. After obtaining payoffs of their feasible 
packages, the customer selects the package with the highest payoff (breaking ties randomly) as 
their first package to bid.  
4.1.2. Price Update and Bidding  
At the beginning of round        , customers need to update their bidding prices for the 
packages submitted at round    , based on the provisional allocation determined  at round 
   . If a customer’s bid was not awarded in the provisional allocation at round    , the 
customer has three price updating options at round  : (1) it can increase its bidding prices by   on 
the package it bid for at round     or rounds before    , where   is the minimum price 
increment imposed by the provider. Since customers are assumed to be rational in maximizing 
their payoffs, they, in general, do not bid with an increment more than  ; (2) it can also keep the 
bidding prices unchanged (taking an   discount). However, if a customer takes this   discount, 
the provider will consider the customer has entered into final bid status and the customer is 
forbidden from increasing the bidding prices on any of its packages in future rounds; and (3) the 
customer can, of course, withdraw from bidding. If a customer is included in the provisional 
allocation at round    , it can keep its bidding price unchanged at round  . That is, it is allowed 
to repeat the same bids at round    . However, the bidding procedure does not prevent the 
customer from entering a higher bid.  
After updating bidding prices, a customer needs to compute its set of payoff maximizing 




maximization problem       [        
    ] and obtains the set of packages that equally 
maximizes the payoff, where   
     is the bidding price for   at round  . That is, for any two 
packages   and    in the payoff maximizing set,         
    =     
     
     . After 
obtaining the set of payoff maximizing packages, the customer randomly picks one and submits 
it to the provider with the updated bidding price. If a customer has entered into final bid status, it 
is no longer allowed to increase its bidding price. However, the customer can repeat its final bid 
in future rounds until termination. The purpose for this final bid repeating arrangement is to 
boost the provider’s revenue. During the iterative bidding process, some bids can be temporarily 
“excluded” from the provisional allocation by a particular combination of allocation constraints 
and resource requirements from other bids with higher combined value.  After several rounds, 
that particular combination may have changed to allow the space for previously excluded bids to 
be included in the allocation. However, without final bid repeating, those bids will not be 
submitted again if their valuations have been reached during the “excluded” periods. Therefore, 
they would not be included, even though capacity becomes available for them in subsequent 
provisional allocations. 
4.1.3. Bids Screening and Termination 
After bids are received from the customers, the provider first screens out invalid bids. Those 
bids will not be considered in the following winner determination procedure. Invalid bids are 
defined as having (1) any bidding price for a package which is below the highest bidding price 
for that same package received in previous rounds, (2) increased prices from customers who 
have already declared their final bidding status in previous rounds, and (3) packages which do 
not contain the base configuration or violate other configuration rules.  
The provider then checks the termination condition against the valid bids. The bidding 
terminates if there are no price updates for all valid bids in the current round. That is, all 
customers that bid in the last round have repeated their bids. After the bidding terminates, the 
provider implements the final allocation and the customers pay their bidding prices. If the 
termination condition is not satisfied, the provider will take the set of valid bids as input and 
solve the winner determination model. After winner determination, the auction goes back to 




4.1.4. Winner Determination 
The provider needs to compute a new provisional allocation in each round as long as the 
bidding is not terminated. The winner determination model is to select a subset of the bids 
submitted by customers such that the overall bidding price of the provisional allocation is 
maximized and the capacity constraints of the provider are not violated. Let    be the set of 
customers submitted their bids at round   and  (  
 ) be the bidding price of   
 , where   
  is the 
package submitted by customer   at round  ,     . Let      if customer   wins and      
otherwise. The winner determination model can be expressed using the following integer 
programming. 
   ∑    (  
 )               
subject to 
∑       
  
   
                       (6) 
   {   }        
           (7)   
Constraints (6) ensure that the bids awarded in a provisional allocation do not violate the 
provider’s capacity constraints. Constraint (7) is a set of integer constraints.  
 The winner determination problem is a general form of the set packing problem which is NP-
hard. In this paper, we use the commercial optimization package ILOG CPLEX 10.2 to solve it. 
Although winner determination problems in combinatorial auctions are in general NP-hard, 
many of them can be solved quickly by modern optimization algorithms to fairly large sizes.  It 
is reported in Andersson et al. (2000) that CPLEX 6.5 performs very well in terms of running 
time for many of the common winner determination problem benchmarks distributions. The 
solving speed is comparable to the special-purpose winner determination algorithms, such as 
those in Fujishima et al. (1999) and Sandholm (2002). It is also shown in Sandholm et al. (2005) 
that some winner determination distributions with thousands of bids in an instance can be solved 
by CPLEX 8.0 within a couple of seconds. Our experiments in Section 5.2 also confirm that 
CPLEX 10.2 can quickly solve the SCCC problem instances with 1000 customers. However, for 
some problems with more domain specific constraints, such as those in Wang et al. (2009), 




4.2. A Worked Example 
In this subsection a worked example in a travel package customization setting is presented to 
demonstrate the application of the auction-based customization model. Suppose a travel agency 
offers “build your own package” tool for its customers to customize their vacation packages for a 
7-day holiday season at a popular destination. Customers should travel to the destination on Day 
1 and return on Day 7. The agency offers a list of travel components including flight reservation, 
hotel reservation, car rental, and tickets to entertainment events. There are multiple services for 
each of the components to accommodate various customer preferences. For example, Departure 
Ticket (DT) can be scheduled in the morning (DT-1), afternoon (DT-2), or evening (DT-3). For 
illustrative purposes, an example of an unrealistically small number of customers (five 
customers) is designed. In table 1 available services and their respective capacity are 
summarized. Table 2 shows customers’ feasible packages and their valuations on them, where 
B(a, b) represents the feasible package b from customer a. Customer value is generated using the 
method described in the computational study section (Section 5.2.1). The base configuration 
includes one and only one service of each of the components DT, RT, and HL. Customers can 
have one to five services from the component ET. To limit the number of rounds of bidding, high 
reservation prices are set for the packages (see Table 2). Submitted bids, provisional allocation, 
provider’s revenue, and customer’s value at each round of bidding are summarized in Table 3.   
is set to be 5. The auction terminates at round 12 with overall customer value at 7370. Compared 
with the optimal value 7790, the auction reaches 95% efficiency in this example. The sum of the 
prices paid by customers (i.e., provider revenue) is 7240, which is close to the overall solution 
value due to competition among customers. The provisional allocations along the bidding 












Table 1 Summary of service capacity  
Service ID Service Description Capacity 
DT-1 Departure Ticket in the morning of Day 1 3 
DT-2 Departure Ticket in the afternoon of Day 1 2 
DT-3 Departure Ticket in the evening of Day 1 2 
RT-1 Return Ticket in the morning of Day 7 2 
RT-2 Return Ticket in the afternoon of Day 7 2 
RT-3 Return Ticket in the evening of Day 7 3 
HL-1 First-class hotel 1 
HL-2 Second-class hotel 3 
HL-3 Motel 2 
ET-1 Sporting event ticket  2 
ET-2 Performing arts ticket 2 
ET-3 Museum ticket 3 
ET-4 Cruise trip ticket 3 
ET-5 Fine dining ticket 2 
 
 
Table 2 Customers’ feasible packages and corresponding reservation prices and value 
Customer Feasible Packages Reservation Price ($) Value ($) 
Cus#1 
B (1,1) = {"DT3" "RT3" "HL3" "ET2" "ET3"} 1410 1445 
B (1,2) = {"DT2" "RT1" "HL1" "ET1""ET3" "ET4" "ET5" } 2200 2250 
B (1,3) = {"DT3" "RT2" "HL2" "ET4"} 1830 1870 
Cus#2 
B (2,1) = {"DT1" "RT3" "HL1" "ET1" "ET2" } 2120 2145 
B (2,2) = {"DT1" "RT1" "HL1"  "ET1" "ET4" "ET5"} 2320 2360 
B (2,3) = {"DT3" "RT3" "HL2" "ET1" "ET3""ET4"  } 2060 2085 
Cus#3 
B (3,1) = {"DT3" "RT3" "HL1" "ET1" "ET2" "ET3"  "ET5"} 2210 2235 
B (3,2) = {"DT1" "RT2" "HL1" "ET1" "ET3""ET4" } 2360 2370 
Cus#4 
B (4,1) = {"DT2" "RT1" "HL3" "ET1""ET2"  "ET3"  "ET4"} 1660 1695 
B (4,2) = {"DT2" "RT1" "HL2" "ET1" "ET3"} 1730 1740 
Cus#5 
B (5,1) = {"DT3" "RT3" "HL2" "ET5"} 1610 1660 
B (5,2) = {"DT1" "RT3" "HL1"  "ET1" "ET3" "ET4" "ET5"} 2360 2375 
B (5,3) = {"DT2" "RT2" "HL1" "ET2""ET4" "ET5" } 2130 2135 
B (5,4) = {"DT3" "RT3" "HL3" "ET3" "ET5"} 1290 1295 
B (5,5) = {"DT1" "RT3" "HL2"  "ET3""ET4"} 1910 1945 
 
 
Table 3 Submitted bids, provisional allocation, provider’s revenue, and customer’s value at each round of bidding 
Round 
# 





1 B (1,2) , B (2,2) , B (3,1) , B (4,1) , B (5,1) B (2,2), B (4,1) , B (5,1) 5590 5715 
2 B (1,2) , B (2,2) , B (3,1) , B (4,1) , B (5,1) B (2,2), B (4,1) , B (5,1) 5590 5715 
3 B (1,2) , B (2,2) , B (3,1) , B (4,1) , B (5,1) B (2,2), B (4,1) , B (5,1) 5590 5715 
4 B (1,3) , B (2,2) , B (3,1) , B (4,1) , B (5,1) B (1,3), B (2,2), B (5,1) 5760 5890 
5 B (1,3) , B (2,2) , B (3,2) , B (4,1) , B (5,1) B (1,3), B (3,2), B (5,1) 5800 5900 
6 B (1,3) , B (2,2) , B (3,2) , B (4,1) , B (5,1) B (1,3), B (3,2), B (5,1) 5800 5900 
7 B (1,3) , B (2,2) , B (3,2) , B (4,1) , B (5,1) B (1,3), B (3,2), B (5,1) 5800 5900 
8 B (1,3) , B (2,1) , B (3,2), B (4,1) , B (5,1) B (1,3) , B (2,1), B (4,1) , B (5,1) 7240 7370 
9 B (1,3) , B (2,1) , B (3,1), B (4,1) , B (5,1) B (1,3) , B (2,1), B (4,1) , B (5,1) 7240 7370 
10 B (1,3) , B (2,1) ,B (3,2)  , B (4,1) , B (5,1) B (1,3) , B (2,1), B (4,1) , B (5,1) 7240 7370 
11 B (1,3) , B (2,1) , B (3,1)  , B (4,1) , B (5,1) B (1,3) , B (2,1), B (4,1) , B (5,1) 7240 7370 





4.3. Implementation Considerations 
The efficiency of auctions largely depends on the level of competition among customers. 
While the Internet provides pervasive accessibility to virtually any electronic market, customers 
may come at different time. To aggregate demand and facilitate competition, Internet auctions 
usually span a couple of days or even longer. Customers can enter the auction and place bids at 
any time before the auction ends. To spare customers the trouble of continuously monitoring the 
bidding process and repeatedly placing their bids, Internet auctions allow bidders to provide 
direct value information to an automated bidding agent called proxy agent which bids on the 
behalf of customer.  
In the proposed iterative auction for SCCC, a proxy agent needs to manage a set of feasible 
packages of the customer and decides which package to submit, at which round, and at what 
price. Thus, the customer should inform the agent its value on each of the feasible packages. In 
the meantime, the agent should be equipped with the algorithm to update bidding prices and 
select the payoff maximization package along the bidding process. If the customer prefers, the 
agent can also inform the customer regarding the bidding status and allow the customer to update 
its value before the auction ends. For easy access, customers may install the proxy agent on a 
personal computer, a smart phone, or other mobile devices. 
Many online travel auctions, including those mentioned previously in this paper, provide a 
“buy it now” option to accommodate those buyers who cannot wait until the auction ends. A 
buyer can purchase the item immediately by paying the buy-it-now price. However, the buy-it-
now price is usually a regular retail price which can be much higher than the final auction price. 
Rigorously, we should not consider buy-it-now as part of the auction design. 
 
4.4. Incentive Issues 
Given the customers’ private value model we have assumed, no customer bids above their 
valuation. In all cases, customers will not get negative payoffs, which encourage them to 
participate in the auction.  However, understanding the incentives that a company has for setting 
up and conducting the proposed auction requires some explanations on the company’s objectives 
for auction design. In auction design there are two common objectives an auctioneer may have. 
The first is economic efficiency, and the second is revenue maximization (de Vries and Vohra, 




auctioneer maximizes the overall values of bidders. Economic efficiency is supported by well-
developed auction theories. A typical example is the canonical Vickrey-Clarke-Groves 
mechanism (Vickrey 1961; Clark 1971; Groves 1973) which simultaneously achieves incentive 
compatibility and efficiency and has guided the design of many auctions. As a result, the 
majority of the auction literature takes economic efficiency as the design objective.  
It is argued in Parkes and Kalagnanam (2005) that the goal of economic efficiency is well 
suited for the design of stable long-term markets that will form the basis for repeated trade. They 
expect that efficient markets will come to dominate the electronic market landscape based on 
their experience with procurement auctions deployed with a large chocolate manufacturer 
(Hohner et al., 2003). In the context of mass customization, economic efficiency is also desirable 
for a company which wants to build long-term business relationship with their customers. It is 
agreed in mass customization literature that one of the major objectives of mass customization is 
to improve customer value. In the long run, a company can only improve its profit by providing 
customers with high value added products and services. The long term benefits brought by the 
efficient auction design provide an incentive for companies to adopt economic efficiency as their 
auction design objective.  
The objective of revenue maximization (optimal auction design), on the other hand, 
maximizes the auctioneer’s revenue. Optimal auctions maximize seller’s revenue in each 
transaction, which are perhaps more appropriate for a one-shot procurement problem, and in a 
setting in which the buyer has considerable market power (Parkes and Kalagnanam, 2005). Even 
a company only cares about short term benefits and wants to get the most out of every 
transactions, an efficient auction design is still a reasonable choice, especially when iterative 
bidding is used as an implementation structure. This is because there are no known optimal (i.e. 
revenue-maximizing) general-purpose combinatorial auctions, iterative or otherwise (Parkes, 
2006). In fact the dynamic exchange of value information between bidders that is enabled within 
iterative combinatorial auctions is known to enhance revenue and efficiency in single item 
auctions with correlated values (Milgrom and Weber, 1982). One should expect efficient 
iterative combinatorial auctions to retain this benefit over their sealed-bid counterparts (Parkes, 
2006). Therefore, from both long term and short term perspectives, a company has the incentives 




The proposed auction is an efficient auction design which is implemented using an iterative 
bidding process. The bidding process is guided by a price mechanism. The revenue that the 
auctioneer collects is the sum of the bidding prices from awarded customers at winner 
determination. Given the design of the bidding procedure, the company’s revenue is guaranteed 
to increase along the bidding process and reach its highest at termination.  Despite the 
formulation of the economic efficiency objective of SCCC, the iterative bidding structure itself 
achieves high seller revenue in the same spirit of many real-world iterative auction applications, 
which supports our claim that the proposed model provides incentives to the seller. 
5. Properties of the Auction-Based Customization Model 
In this section the performance of the auction-based customization model is evaluated. The 
game-theoretic property of the model and efficiency analysis on the application of the model to a 
special case of the SCCC problem is first provided. The performance of the model on general 
SCCC problems is also evaluated through a computational study. 
5.1. Analytical Results 
In this paper, customers are treated as self-interested agents in the sense that they maximize their 
own objectives without considering the overall system performance. Requiring customers to 
reveal their valuations on packages is not practical because customers may fear that the provider 
will take advantage of the information and consequently charge higher prices for their favorite 
packages. In microeconomics, there are two approaches to modeling agent behaviors. The first 
model is game-theoretic and is based on mechanism design theory. In this model the equilibrium 
state is defined by the condition that agents play a best-response strategy to each other and 
cannot benefit from a unilateral deviation to an alternative strategy. The second model of agent 
behavior is price-taking, or myopic best-response, and relates to competitive equilibrium theory. 
In this second model, the equilibrium state is defined by the condition that an agent plays a best-
response to the current price and allocation in the market, without modeling either the strategies 
of other agents or the effect of its own actions on the future state of the market. Mechanism 
design theory and game-theoretic modeling are most relevant when there is a small number of 
agents and when agents are expected to be rational and well-informed about the likely 




relevant in large systems in which the effect of an agent’s own strategy on the state of a market is 
small, or when there is considerable uncertainty about agent preferences and behaviors and no 
useful mechanism with dominant strategy equilibrium. In the design of the auction-based 
customization model for SCCC, customers are modeled as price takers because in mass 
customization environments it is reasonable to assume that the number of customers is not small. 
Therefore, the proposed auction is incentive compatible in the sense that customers will follow 
the myopic best-response bidding strategy prescribed by the proposed auction protocol.    
The rest of the section is devoted to the evaluation of the quality of the customization 
solutions computed using the auction model. Since the objective is to maximize social welfare, 
quality here is defined as the sum of the value provided to all customers in a customization 
solution. Analytical results are developed for a special case of SCCC, in which a customer only 
has one feasible package. As stated in the following proposition, the proposed auction procedure 
computes optimal solutions for the special case.  
Proposition 1: For a special case of the SCCC problem, where each of the customers only has 
one feasible service package and their value on the package is congruent to the reservation price 
of the package modulo ε, the iterative bidding procedure with final bid repeating always 
maximizes the sum of customers’ valuations at its termination.  
Proof: Since customers are assumed to take a private value model, a customer is willing to pay 
up to its value to get a package. Therefore, if a customer is not awarded in a provisional 
allocation, the customer will keep increasing its bidding prices in future rounds until it is 
awarded or it reaches its valuation. In the case of final bid repeating, customers repeat their 
previous bids at termination (round   . Therefore, all customers that are not included in the final 
allocation (denoted   ) have bids with their valuations and the customers that have room to 
increase their bidding prices at termination are all included in   . The proposition is proved by 
showing that    is identical to the optimal allocation    computed by solving the winner 
determination problem using all customers’ valuations as input. 
The customers’ bidding prices are constructed for an additional round (round    ) as 
follows. Pick a customer      with a bidding price at termination (denoted as   
 ) that is 
smaller than their valuation. Let   
      
    .   is selected to make sure that   
    is the 




price modulo  ,   must be an integer. For any other customer      and   ,    
      
 . Let 
     be the resultant allocation generated by the winner determination for round    . The first 
step is to prove          by contradiction. Suppose        , consider the following two 
cases. 
Case #1:       . Because    is the allocation that maximizes the provider’s revenue given 
the set of bidding prices at round   and it is assumed that        , it follows that ∑   
 
     
∑   
 
      . By adding    to both sides, it follows that ∑   
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    . That is, ∑   
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   , it follows that ∑   
 
         
    ∑   
   
       , which means  
    does 
not contain the set of customers whose bidding prices at round     maximize the provider’s 
revenue. This is a contradiction to the assumption. 
Case #2:       . Because    is the allocation that maximizes the provider’s revenue given 
the set of bidding prices at round   and         is assumed, it follows that ∑   
 
     
∑   
 
      . Since ∑   
 
     ∑   
 
         
 , it is clear that ∑   
 
         
     
∑   
 
      . Given the way that bidding prices at round     are constructed and    
   , it is 
followed that ∑   
   
         
    ∑   
   
      , which means  
    does not contain the set 
of customers whose bidding prices at round     maximize the provider’s revenue. This is also 
a contradiction to the assumption.  
By deriving two contradictions in case #1 & #2, it can be concluded that        . It is now 
ready to prove that    is optimal, that is,      . Note that    is a schedule computed using all 
customers’ valuations as input. In      , customer   has a bid with its valuation. Since   was an 
arbitrary pick,         can be a general conclusion for all other customers included in   . By 
repeating the above process for each of the customers, the bidding procedure can reach a final 
round where all customers included in    bid with their valuations. Note that, by definition, the 
resultant allocation at this final round is   . Therefore,      . It follows that    maximizes the 
sum of customers’ valuations. █ 
5.2. Value and Revenue Performance under Various Product Customizability  
Products with a higher level of customizability will likely meet individual customer needs 




customization costs and improve operational efficiency, service providers usually restrict 
customers’ freedom in choosing any combination of the services by imposing configuration 
rules. The proposed customization model allows providers to adjust the customizability of 
packages by defining different base configurations. When customizing a package, a customer is 
required to incorporate the services defined in the base configuration into the package. In terms 
of platform-based product development, the base configuration serves as a base product on 
which customers build their customized products. In this subsection the value and revenue 
performance of the auction-based customization model is validated under various levels of 
product customizability imposed by the service provider. The proposed model is also compared 
with the commonly used First-Come-First-Served capacity allocation approach in terms of 
solution values. The design of the set of testing data used for the experiments is described as 
follows.  
5.2.1. Design of the testing data 
The customization environment in which the computational study is conducted is the one 
described in the worked example. However, to demonstrate the practical relevance of the 
experiments, the number of customers and the capacity of services are now increased to a 
realistic scale. Customer value is also generated from common pricing schemes found in online 
travel auctions. In travel auction websites, such as eBay Travel (http://www.ebay.com), Luxury 
Link (http://www.luxurylink.com), and Sky Auction (http://www.skyauction.com), a package to 
be sold has a “buy it now” price which is usually its regular retail price. A customer can purchase 
the package immediately at the regular retail price if unwilling to wait until the termination of the 
auctions. However, if the customer wants a bargain, it must participate in the auction. The final 
auction price is determined by the market competition at the termination of the auction. A 
package also has a reservation price. The reservation price is often unknown to the customers. In 
the design of the testing data, it is assumed that there is a regular retail price for each of the 
available services and the retail price for a package is the sum of the retail prices of services 
included in the package. The reservation price for a package is set to be 40% of its retail price 
since it is common in the online travel auctions that the termination price can be as low as 60% 
discount from the regular retail price. It is assumed that customers who enter the auction expect 
some discount. They are not interested in purchasing the package at a price higher than the 




Therefore, customer value on a package are randomly drawn from a uniform probability 
distribution between zero and its regular retail price. 10 SCCC problem groups are generated 
with the customer number ranging from 100 to 1000. For each group, 10 instances are randomly 
generated. Service capacity is also allocated in proportion to the number of customers such that, 
for most of the instances, around 80%-90% of the customers will be awarded a feasible package. 
For all instances, feasible packages of a customer must contain one of DT, one of RT, and one of 
HL.  
5.2.2. Experimental Results 
The auction-based customization model is evaluated in terms of its value and revenue 
performance under various levels of product customizability imposed by the service provider. 
For the computational study, three levels of product customizability are considered. The three 
levels are defined by different base configurations: Config#1= {one of DT, one of RT, one of 
HL}, Config#2= {one of DT, one of RT, one of HL, one of ET}, Config#3= {one of DT, one of 
RT, one of HL, three of ET}. The numbers of services contained in the three configurations are 
3, 4, and 6. The solutions computed under Config#1 are used as the baseline for comparison. For 
each group of the problem instances, optimal solution value under Config#1 is computed by 
solving the SCCC integer programming model presented in Section 3. The SCCC model is coded 
in ILOG Optimization Programming Languages (http://www-
01.ibm.com/software/websphere/products/optimization/) and the 10 groups of problem instances 
are solved using ILOG CPLEX. The flow control of the iterative bidding is coded in the OPL 
(Optimization Programming Languages) script language. A desktop PC with 2.4G Intel CPU and 
8 GB memory is used to run the experiments. For all problem instances including those contain 
1000 customers, an iteration of bidding and winner determination takes less than one second. 
This level of responsiveness is sufficient for the vast majority of service customization 
applications.  
Table 4 Customer value and provider revenue generated at different levels of package customizability 
Group  


























1 $211,705 $210,535 $174,380 $166,420 $110,080 $96,585 $73,085 $57,890 




3 $633,215 $618,880 $482,370 $493,610 $336,620 $294,485 $173,650 $137,970 
4 $848,365 $846,295 $691,550 $662,700 $448,860 $397,790 $211,955 $166,980 
5 $1,055,680 $1,039,410 $814,790 $816,505 $563,895 $503,075 $279,435 $219,160 
6 $1,269,615 $1,245,415 $963,130 $954,235 $676,915 $599,330 $333,085 $259,360 
7 $1,473,780 $1,453,190 $1,130,300 $1,128,480 $787,980 $696,880 $390,545 $303,210 
8 $1,688,120 $1,680,505 $1,354,670 $1,294,280 $900,455 $802,365 $453,520 $353,030 
9 $1,907,200 $1,889,915 $1,476,390 $1,497,350 $1,014,995 $899,630 $515,165 $402,940 
10 $2,114,810 $2,101,835 $1,681,890 $1,655,410 $1,126,325 $994,805 $568,815 $443,030 
The solutions computed by the auction-based customization model are compared against the 
optimal ones computed by ILOG CPLEX. The first column of Table 4 shows the average 
optimal solution values for the 10 groups of testing problems. The second column and the third 
column show the solution value and revenues computed by the auction-based customization 
model. All customers are assumed to adopt final-bid-repeating and      for all bidding. It is 
observed that the auction-based customization model can achieve on average 98% of the optimal 
value across the 10 groups of problem instances. The average revenue computed is 
approximately 78% of the optimal value.  
To evaluate the impacts of package customizability on customer value, the testing problems 
are solved again with Config#2 and Config#3. When conducting the iterative bidding, all biding 
packages which do not satisfy Config#2 and Config#3 configuration requirements are excluded 
at the bids screening stage. Column five and Column six of Table 4 show the solution value and 
revenues with Config#2. It is observed that, on average, the solution value decreases to 53% of 
that with Config#1 and revenues decrease to 59% of that with Config#1. If Config#3 is applied, 
solution value will decrease to 27% of that with Config#1 and revenues will decrease to 28% of 
that with Config#1. It is evident from the experimental results that reducing product 
customizability can significantly decrease customers’ overall value and provider’s revenue.  
The proposed customization approach is also compared against the commonly used first-
come-first-served capacity allocation policy. For example, “build your own package” 
applications in travel industry usually allocate a provider’s capacity on a first-come-first-served 
basis combined with dynamic pricing strategies. This approach is easy to implement and 
performs reasonably well in terms of enhancing revenue when capacity supply and demand are 
balanced. However, when demand exhibits strong seasonality, auction-based policy may perform 
better. Again, take travel package customization as an example. During high seasons, a service 




according to the customer arrival order rather than customers’ value. It does not maximize 
overall customer value. To compare the performance of an auction-based policy against that of a 
first-come-first-served capacity allocation policy, each policy is applied to the 10 groups of 
SCCC testing problems. In the first-come-first-served policy scenario, customers in an instance 
are first randomly ordered. Capacity is allocated according to their position in the sequence until 
no more customers can be satisfied. Column 4 of Table 4 shows the solution value of the first-
come-first-served policy over the testing problems under Config#1. It is observed that first-
come-first-served policy achieves on average 78% of the value obtained by the auction-based 
customization model.  
6. Conclusion  
Previous study has developed the mechanism which aligns the capability flexibilities between 
a customer and a supplier through bilateral negotiation (Chen and Tseng, 2007). The proposed 
approach optimizes customer value by exploiting the capacity flexibilities among a group of 
customers. To this end, this paper describes an auction-based multilateral negotiation model 
which coordinates customers’ customization requirements such that the overall customer value is 
maximized. The approach is incentive-compatible in the sense that customers will follow the 
myopic best-response bidding strategy prescribed by the auction protocol. The results of our 
experiments indicate that customization solutions computed by the proposed model are very 
close to the optimal one. Revenue performance is also adequate when there is sufficient 
competition in the market. The scalability of the approach is tested by applying the model to 
instances with up to 1000 customers. Based on the testing results, it can be concluded that the 
auction-procedure combined with ILOG CPLEX is capable of dealing with service 
customization problems of realistic scales.  
Throughout the paper, it has been assumed that the service provider’s capacity is known and 
fixed. In the future we will study settings where a provider’s capacity is expandable and subject 
to dynamic changes. For applying the proposed approach to manufacturing mass customization, 
more efforts are warranted in capacity representation under various product family architectures. 
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